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Since first identified by Anderson in the 70s, memory corruption vulnerabilities
are still among the top three of the CWE SANS most dangerous software 
errors. Even now, nearly 400 memory corruption errors have been discovered 
in CVEs in the past 10 years. Memory corruption errors are especially common 
in applications written in type-unsafe languages like C and C++, due to the 
pointer operations supported in these languages. The ability to manipulate 
pointers provides an efficient way to design applications and systems, 
but using it incorrectly often leads to unintentional modification of related 
memory content, enabling an attacker to exploit such a vulnerability by either 
compromising sensitive data or hijacking the control flow. It is hard to convince 
developers to switch to type-safe languages, not only because of performance, 
but also because of backward compatibility reasons.
The problem of improving the security of applications or systems written in 
C/C++ has been recognized by the community for a long time, but previous 
solutions often introduce non-acceptable overheads, and many require source 
information, which is often unavailable for legacy binaries.
In this dissertation, we argue that address space runtime randomization can be
effective against memory corruption attacks with general applicability to 
different memory spaces: heap space, stack space and code space. Our 
investigation focuses on improving the security guarantees provided by ASLR 
and prior work in the area, while also improving performance, capabilities, and 
re-randomization frequency. To substantiate our claims, we present several 
contributions and demonstrate the viability of the proposed techniques in 
practice. In particular, we present the first selfcontained solution to randomize 
legacy binaries at runtime without requiring for any hardware, kernel, or source 
code support.
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